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KATZENBACH V. MORGAN AND THE 18 YEAR OLD VOTE
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently the 91st Congress passed the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970.1 The provisions of the statute include Title
III which extended the right of suffrage to eighteen year old
citizens in all federal, state, and local elections. 2 The basis for
1 Pub. L. No. 91-285, tit. III (June 22, 1970) [hereinafter Voting Rights Act]
2 Voting Rights Act, tit. Ill:
"Title Ill-REDUCING VOTING AGE TO EIGHTEEN
IN FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL ELECTIONS
'Declaration and Findings
"Sec. 301 (a) The Congress finds and declares that the imposition and
application of the requirement that a citizen be twenty-one years of age as a
precondition to voting in any primary or in any election-
" (1) denies and abrides the inherent constitutional rights of citizens
eighteen years of age but not yet twenty-one years of age to vote-a partic-
ularly unfair tratment of such citizens in view of the national defense respon-
sibilities imposed upon such citizens;
" (2) has the effect of denying to citizens eighteen years of age but not yet
twenty-one years of age the due process and equal protection of the laws that
are guaranteed to them under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution; and
" (3) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling state
interest.
" (b) In order to secure the Constitutional rights set forth in subsection (a),
the Congress declares that it is necessary to prohibit the denial of the right to
vote to citizens of the United States eighteen years of age or over.
" Prohibition
"Sec. 302 Except as required by the Constitution, no citizen of the United
States who is otherwise qualified to vote in any state or political subdivision
in any primary or in any election shall be denied the right to vote in any such
primary or election on account of age if such citizen is eighteen years of age
or older.
Enforcement
"Sec. 303 (a) (1) In the exercise of the powers of Congress under the
necessary and proper clause of section 8, article I of the Constitution, and
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, the Attorney
General is authorized and directed to institute in the name of the United
States such actions against States or political subdivisions, including actions
for injunctive relief, as he may determine to be necessary to implement the
purpose of this title.
" (2) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdictions
institutedpursuant to this title, which shall be heard and determined by a
court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of
Title 28 of the United States Code, and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme
Court. It shall be the duty of the judges designated to hear the case to assign
the case for hearing and determination thereof, and to cause the case to be in
every way expedited.
" (b) Whoever shall deny or attempt to deny any person of any right
secured by this title shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
" Definition
"Sec. 304 As used in this title the term 'State' includes the District of
Columbia.
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enacting Title III was the belief of Congress3 that citizens be-
tween the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, by being denied the
right to vote, were being denied equal protection of the laws as
required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 4 The purpose of this note is to briefly trace the
historical development of Congress' power to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause and from this basis to examine the con-
stitutionality of Title III.
1I. HISTORY OF SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
An examination of the Fourteenth Amendment reveals that
Congress has the power under Section 5 to enforce equal protec-
tion of the laws for all citizens by appropriate legislation. 5 During
the early history of the Amendment, Congress' power under sec-
tion 5 was severely restricted by the courts. A line of Supreme
Court decisions made it clear that Congress could legislate under
the Enforcement Clause only to correct recognized violations of
the Equal Protection Clause. 6 Congress could not, on its own
initiative, determine that a denial of equal protection had oc-
curred. Thus, only the courts had the authority to interpret the
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Congress could do no more than follow the court decisions. 7 This
was the position of the Court until 1966.
In the 1960's the Court began to recognize the right of Con-
"Effective Date
"Sec. 305 The provisions of Title Ill shall take effect with respect to any
primary or election held on or after January I, 1971."
3 Voting Rights Act, §301 (a) (2).
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
6 See, for example, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 545 (1875). The
defendants were indicted under the criminal provisions of the federal civil rights legislation
of 1870. The defendants were charged with conspiracy to hinder a group of Negro citizens
from exercising their "lawful right and privilege to peacefully assemble together with each
other and with other citizens of the United States for a peaceful and lawful purpose." The
indictment was invalid as not stating an offense under the statute.
In United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882), the defendants were indicted for
having violated section 5519 of the Revised Statutes which made it unlawful for two or
more persons to conspire for the purpose of depriving any person or class of persons "of
the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws... "
106 U.S. at 632. The Court held the statute unconstitutional on the basis that no state
action violated equal protection and thus the Fourteenth Amendment "imposes no duty
and confers no power upon Congress." 106 U.S. at 639.
See also Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), where defendants were indicted for
violating the Civil Rights Act passed March 1, 1875. The Court held that the specific
provisions of the act which led to the indictment were unconstitutional because the
Congress had no authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to control individual acts but
was limited to creating legislation to protect against state action which violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.7 See Comment, Residence Requirements for Voting in Presidential Elections, 37
U. CHi. L. REV. 359, 384 (1970). See generally Comment, Equal Protection
Clause-Congressional Power of Initial Determination, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 827 (1966).
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gress initially to determine when to implement its constitutional
powers.8 In Katzenbach v. McClung,9 the Court explicitly estab-
lished that Congress has the power of initial determination under
the Commerce Clause. Shortly thereafter the Court in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach'° interpreted Congress' power of initial
determination to include the right of Congress to preclude racially
discriminatory voting practices under the Fifteenth Amendment.
These cases provide the framework in which the Supreme
Court decided Katzenbach v. Morgan." In this decision, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of section 4(e) of the Voting
Rights Act of 196512 by finding that Congress under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment had the ability to exercise its dis-
cretion in determining what legislation is needed to secure the
guarantees of equal protection.'
3
Section 4(e) provided that no citizen who had completed six
years of primary education in any Puerto Rican school in which
English was not the language of instruction, could be denied his
right to vote in any election because of his inability to read and
speak the English language. In overruling objections to the con-
stitutionality of the section, the Court wrote:
Correctly viewed, section 5 is a positive grant of legislative
power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in de-
termining whether and what legislation is needed to secure
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
14
Furthermore when discussing the extent to which the judicial
branch could review such a determination by Congress the Court
stated:
It is not for us to review the Congressional resolution of these
factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon
which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.' 5
Thereby the Court extended the power of initial determination in
8 See Comment, Equal Protection Clause, supra note 7.
9379 U.S. 294 (1964). The Court upheld the constitutionality of Title 11 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The Court held that the statute was valid under Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause. The Court further decided that if Congress in light of the
facts and testimony before them have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory
scheme necessary to the protection of commerce it could not find the statute invalid.
10 383 U.S. 301 (1966). Here, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the sections of
the 1965 Voting Rights Act which prohibited the use of literacy tests in determining voter
qualification on the basis that under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment Congress may
use any rational means to eliminate racial discrimination as against the states.
11 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
12 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1969).
13 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5.
14 384 U.S. at 65 1.
Is 384 U.S. at 653.
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implementing the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to
Congress and, consequently, authorized Congress to interpret the
substantive provisions of this Amendment. It is within the context
of this historical background that the constitutionality of Title III
must be examined.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TITLE III OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT AMENDMENT OF 1970
The United States Constitution delegates the power to estab-
lish voter qualifications to the states. 16 However, this power is
restricted by applicable provisions of the Constitution. 17 Con-
gress, under Morgan, has an affirmative power under the Enforce-
ment Clause to enact appropriate legislation to promote the provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 8 Thus, the only determination for the Court is to
answer "whether such legislation is, as required by Section 5,
appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause."' 9
(Emphasis supplied).
To determine whether a specific legislative enactment is appro-
priate legislation, the Court has traditionally turned to the stan-
dards pronounced in McCulloch v. Maryland.20 Applied to the
Fourteenth Amendment, these tests consist of examining whether
the legislation may be regarded as an enactment to enforce the
Equal Protection Clause, whether it is plainly adapted to that end,
and whether it is consistent with the letter and spirit of the
Constitution. 2'
16 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2. U.S. CONST. amend XIV. See also Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1966), where the Court stated: "Under the distribution of powers effected
by the Constitution, the States establish qualification for voting for state officers, and the
qualifications established by the States for voting for members of the most numerous
branch of the state legislature also determine who may vote for United States Representa-
tives and Senators .... " at 647.
17 "But, of course, the States have no power to grant or withhold the franchise on
conditions that are forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment, or any other provision of the
Constitution." 384 U.S. at 647.
1' As stated by the Court: "Correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power
authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation
is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." 384 U.S. at 651.
19 384 U.S. at 650.
20 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). The Court through Chief Justice Marshall initially
established the classic formulation of the reach of Congress's powers under the Necessary
and Proper Clause when it held:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are con-
stitutional.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 421.
21 This was also the standard applied in Morgan:
We therefore proceed to the consideration whether § 4(e) is 'appropriate legis-
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In deciding whether section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 could be regarded as an enactment to promote equal protec-
tion, the Court in Morgan considered two factors. It noted that
Congress "explicitly declared that it enacted section 4(e) 'to se-
cure the rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of persons
educated in American flag schools in which the predominant
classroom language was other than English.' "22 It also noted that
more specifically, section 4(e) may be viewed as a measure to
secure for the Puerto Rican community residing in New York
nondiscriminatory treatment by government-both in the im-
position of voting qualifications and the provision or adminis-
tration of governmental services, such as public schools, pub-
lic housing, and law enforcement. 23
In enacting Title III Congress carefully reiterated the consid-
erations accepted by the Court in Morgan, by explicitly declaring
that it enacted Title III to secure rights protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment:
Congress finds and declares that the imposition and appli-
cation of a requirement that a citizen be twenty-one years of
age as a precondition to voting in any primary or any elec-
tion.., has the effect of denying to citizens eighteen years of
age but not yet twenty-one years of age the due process and
equal protection of the laws that are guaranteed to them
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution .... In
order to secure the Constitutional rights set forth in subsec-
tion (a), the Congress declares that it is necessary to prohibit
the denial of the right to vote to citizens of the United States
eighteen years of age and over.24
Therefore, Title III expresses a congressional determination that
the present voting laws express an invidious discrimination
against a class of citizens. If such discrimination exists, then the
second test of McCulloch is met-that the legislation is plainly
adapted to end the discrimination -for those over eighteen are
given the right to vote.
Finally, according to McCulloch as interpreted in Morgan, the
enactment must not be prohibited by, but must be consistent with,
lation' to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, that is, under the McCulloch v.
Maryland standard, whether § 4(e) may be regarded as an enactment to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause, whether it is 'plainly adapted to that end' and
whether it is not prohibited by but is consistent with the 'letter and spirit of the
Constitution.'
384 U.S. at 65 1.
22 384 U.S. at 652.
23 384 U.S. at 652.
2 Pub. L. 91-285, tit. III, § 301(a)(2) (b) (June 22, 1970).
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the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Morgan, in applying this
test, demands that such legislation does not dilute guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment 25 or violate other portions of the
Constitution.26 Title 1II, Congress argues, does not dilute the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment but, by extending the
franchise to a class which has unjustifiably been denied the right
to vote, promotes and enforces equal protection. Furthermore, it
does not appear that such an extention of the sufferage is in-
consistent with other portions of the Constitution. Although the
Consitution provides in Article I, Section 1I and the Seventeenth
Amendment that the states shall set voting requirements, the
requirements may not deny the equal protection guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment.27 Having complied with the third and
final standard of the McCulloch test, Title III appears to be an
appropriate exercise of congressional power under the Enforce-
ment Clause.
Yet, whether Title III is, in fact, an appropriate exercise of
congressional power under the Enforcement Clause must in the
final analysis depend upon the validity of the congressional deter-
mination that denial of the vote to eighteen year olds is a denial of
equal protection. Even though Congress has met the tests of
McCulloch by deciding and remedying what Congress feels is a
denial of equal protection, the final determination of whether there
is such a denial must rest with the Supreme Court.
Morgan determines that in reviewing a congressional finding of
discrimination, the Court may not overturn the congressional
determination if it is reasonable. The Court need only "perceive a
rational basis upon which Congress might resolve the conflict as it
384 U.S. at 651 n. 10:
Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, post, p. 668, § 5 does not grant
Congress power to exercise discretion in the other direction and to enact
statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of
this Court. We emphasize that Congress' power under § 5 is limited to
adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants
Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.
26 384 U.S. at 656.
27 In Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1958) the Court said:
Article 1, § 2 of the Constitution in its provision for the election of members
of the House of Representatives and the Seventeenth Amendment in its
provision for the election of Senators provide that officials will be chosen 'by
the people.' Each provision goes on to state the 'the Electors in each State
shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous
Branch of the State legislature.' So while the right of suffrage is established
and guaranteed by the Constitution it is subject to the imposition of state
standards which are not discriminatory and which do not contravene any
restriction that Congress acting pursuant to its constitutional powers has
imposed.
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did." 28 The Court should be able to perceive such a rational basis
in the present situation.
Under the existing laws two classes of citizens are established,
those over twenty-one who may vote and those under twenty-one
who are not eligible to vote. Yet both of these classes form part of
a larger class- the group of American citizens mature and respon-
sible enough to exercise a vote-and Congress has determined
that all within this larger class, those over eighteen, satisfy the
criteria to enable one to vote. The reasoning of Congress is clear.
Both these classes of citizens are subject to several of the same
laws which substantially affect their personal and property rights.
The selective service laws 29 and laws subjecting a citizen to
federal criminal prosecution as an adult3 0 include all citizens over
eighteen, not only those over twenty-one. Since involuntary con-
scription is the result of the draft and incarceration is the result of
prosecution, their application may result in serious restriction of
personal liberties.
Nevertheless, only the class of those citizens over twenty-one
has a right to participate in the decision-making process of feder-
al policy, which in turn determines the size of the draft calls and
decides which acts are to be considered criminal and the neces-
sary punishment if they are committed. The result is that one
class of citizens is subject to the jurisdiction of these laws without
being able to express his vote upon the policy determining the
extent to which these statutes are effectuated. This classification
creates the invidious discrimination alleviated by Title III.
The States, in opposing the validity of the act, assert that it
would be an unwarranted extension of Morgan for the Court to
accept the congressional determination of the existence of an
invidious discrimination on a "rational basis" test, yet never de-
cide the true question of whether an invidious discrimination in
fact exists. Otherwise, the congressional opinion must always be
upheld. The argument of the State, is that, in this case, Congress
has not shown that denying eighteen year olds the right to vote
denies them equal protection of the laws.
Assuming that classification by age is a rational method of
determining who is able to vote, the only relevant question is
whether there is an invidious discrimination by the States in
choosing twenty-one instead of eighteen. The States cite several
reasons why this age distinction is not an invidious dis-
28 384 U.S. at 654.
2 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (1968).
30 18 U.S.C. ch. 403 (1969).
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crimination.31 Initially they point to the period of time and the
number of court decisions that have consistently approved voting
at age twenty-one.3 2 In addition, it is difficult to believe that the
age designated for coming of majority, adopted by all states at the
founding of our country and currently in effect in 46 of the states,
has been an almost 200 year discrimination against those younger
than twenty-one.
The States also attack the congressional rationale in determin-
ing that a minimum voting age of twenty-one denies equal protec-
tion to those between eighteen and twenty-one.33 Title III of the
Act states that the twenty-one age requirement is "particularly
unfair treatment ... in view of national defense respon-
sibilities."'3 4 Although it is true that both selective service respon-
sibilities and prosecution for criminal activity are tied to the age of
eighteen,35 other federal burdens are imposed at different ages.
For example, the federal income tax will fall upon sixteen and
eighteen year olds alike.
In addition, more than national interests are affected by the
citizens' voting, and any attempt to establish an invidious dis-
crimination based on the minimum age of twenty-one must take
state interests into consideration. Although for purposes of federal
prosecution, one is a juvenile if under eighteen years of age, the
juvenile courts in Michigan, for example, have jurisdiction of
children under seventeen, and in cases involving felonies one as
young as fifteen years may be tried as an adult.3 6 Thus, if the
question before the Congress was whether the twenty-one year
old vote created an invidious discrimination and, if so, how to
alleviate it, then perhaps Congress should have decided either
fifteen, sixteen or seventeen was the proper age because persons
in these age groups both pay taxes, and in some states, can be
prosecuted as adults.3 7
31 See Plaintiff's brief for the State of Oregon, Oregon v. Mitchell, No. 43 Original, (Oct
Term 1970).
3
2 See,for example, Riley v. Holmer, 100 Fla. 938, 131 So. 330 (1930), where the Court
relied on the state constitutional voting requirement of twenty-one years, against an
eighteen year old plaintiff's claim that, as a married man, he was entitled to vote. See also
Dorsey v. Brigham, 177 Ill. 250, 52 N.E. 303 (1898), upholding state constitutional voting
requirement of twenty-one years as applied to women voters; Edwin v. Benton, 120 Ky.
536, 87 S.W. 291 (1905), and Widick v. Rolsom, 303 Ky. 373, 197 S.W.2d 261 (1946),
both upholding the state constitutional voting requirement of twenty-one years.
33 See note 31 supra.
34 See note 2 supra.
35 See notes 29 and 30 supra.
36 MICH. CoMP LAWS § 764.27 (1968). The statute provides in part: "That in any case
where a child over the age of 15 years is charged with a felony the judge of pro-
bate ... may ... waive jurisdiction; whereupon it shall be lawful to try such child in the
court having general criminal jurisdiction of such offenses." [Emphasis added].
37 For an example of states providing for a lower age requirement for criminal
[VOL. 4:1
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This analogy serves the States in two ways. First, they main-
tain that, regardless of the congressional determination, the
differences in ages required for voting do not deny equal protec-
tion because there is no invidious classification. No one is denied
the right to vote, as in previous voting rights cases;38 rather, that
right is simply delayed in accordance with reasonable state deci-
sions about the maturity of people at different ages. Even though
burdens are imposed upon citizens at various ages under
twenty-one-at fifteen as well as eighteen-the simple fact of age
differences cannot be an adequate basis for a congressional finding
of invidious discrimination. Article 1, Section 2 and the Sev-
enteenth Amendment establish that the states shall determine
voting requirements. The Fourteenth Amendment does not give
Congress the right to second-guess the states upon their determi-
nations; it only gives Congress the right to affirmatively act to
eliminate denials of equal protection, and no such denial can be
shown.
Second, the States can use the fifteen year old analogy to argue
that Congress has not complied with the second requirement of
McCulloch: that the legislation is plainly adapted to alleviate the
discrimination.39 If Congress is correct that the twenty-one year
old vote denies equal protection to those under twenty-one, then
Congress fails to alleviate that discrimination when it creates
another invidious classification between those eighteen and those
younger. Although the State arguments possess significant valid-
ity, they fail to offset the unique presumption the Court in Mor-
gan places upon the congressional, not the states', belief about
the existence of an invidious discrimination. As the Court stated
in.Morgan, "the states have no power to grant or withhold the
franchise on conditions that are forbidden by the Fourteenth
prosecutions as an adult, see CAL. WELF. INST'NS CODE § 707 (West 1966), which allows
the court discretion to direct that a minor of sixteen years and above be prosecuted under
the applicable criminal statute or ordinance as an adult rather than be dealt with under the
auspices of the juvenile Court. See also ILL. CODE ANN. ch. 37 § 702-2, confining the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court to males under the age of seventeen , and to females under
the age of eighteen, who have violated a state or federal law, or municipal ordinance; TEX.
CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 2338 § 6 (b) (1966) providing that the juvenile court may waive
jurisdiction and transfer to an appropriate district court or criminal district court for
criminal proceedings any child of age fifteen or over charged with commission of a felony.
38 See, for example, Harper v. Virginia Board of Education 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
where the Court held that a "State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an
electoral standard;" and Carrington v. Rash 380 U.S. 89 (1965), where the Court declared
as being a denial of equal protection a provision of the Texas Constitution which prohibit-
ed any member of the armed forces of the United States who moves to Texas during his
military career from voting in any election in Texas so long as he remained a member of
the armed forces.
39 See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
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Amendment." 40 This determination is given to the Congress un-
der Section 5. In the words of the Court,
[i]t is not for us to review the congressional resolution of
these factors. It is enough that we are able to perceive a basis
upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it
did. 41
If Congress truly has the authority to balance the factors and the
courts will not carefully scrutinize the accuracy of Congress'
decision, then the congressional suggestions of discrimination will
override the arguments of the States.
The States also argue that Morgan can be distinguished from
the present facts, by limiting its holding to the now traditional
Fourteenth Amendment litigation which invalidates state restric-
tions on ethnic minorities' rights.42 Morgan decided that Congress
could determine that citizens educated in Puerto Rican Schools
could not be denied their right to vote because of an inability to
read English. Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, thus, super-
ceded New York State Laws to the contrary. 43 Inherent in this
case, however, was a racial discrimination. Acknowledging this,
the Court stated:
The practical effect of § 4(e) is to prohibit New York from
denying the right to vote to large segments of its Puerto Rican
community. 44
Puerto Ricans were denied the right to vote because they were a
Spanish-speaking people educated in Spanish-taught schools.
Therefore, had a private citizen instituted suit against New York
on the basis of discrimination in its voting laws, there is a signifi-
cant likelihood that the Puerto Rican's plea for equal protection
on voting would have been sustained on the basis of racial dis-
crimination. The same is clearly not true of the twenty-one year
old vote. Had an eighteen year old citizen challenged the con-
stitutionality of his state's twenty-one year old voting law, most
likely he would not have succeeded. Unlike the particular area of
racial discrimination, legislation that discriminates on bases other
40 384 U.S. at 647.
41 384 U.S. at 653.
42 See, for example, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
where separate but equal schools for purposes of segregating black and white children
were found to be a denial of equal protection; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority 365
U.S. 715 (1961), where a restaurant owner whose restaurant located within an off-street
municipally controlled auto parking structure was found to have violated the Equal
Protection Clause when it refused to serve food or drink solely to those of the Negro race;
Evans v. Newton 382 U.S. 296 (1966), where it was held to be a denial of equal protection
to refuse to let Blacks use a private park because of their race.
43 N.Y. CONST. art. 11, § 1; N.Y. ELECTION LAW § § 150, 168 (1964).
-384 U.S. at 652.
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than race will be struck down only if there is no rational basis for
the discrimination. 45
Although the States may point out that recent cases finding
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment have concerned
civil rights of ethnic minorities, there is no indication that the
Court sought to limit its opinion in Morgan to similar situations.
There is no language in Morgan to the effect that the Court meant
the standards pronounced in the case were to apply only in cases
involving the equal protection of ethnic minorities and that a
different set of standards would be created to deal with the use of
Section 5 powers in cases not involving ethnic minorities. The
Court merely states:
Correctly viewed section 5 is a positive grant of legislative
power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in de-
termining whether and what legislation is needed to secure
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. 46
It added that Section 5 cannot be read to limit.Congress' power to
enact only legislation precluding state laws that the courts are
prepared to declare prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. 47
In these statements the Court speaks of an expanded congression-
al power under the Enforcement Clause.
4 See, for example, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), where the Supreme
Court held Maryland's creation of a maximum family grant in the distribution of welfare
under AFDC to be a reasonable, not invidious, discrimination. Although the Maryland
statute, passed in accord with the AFDC program, defined need in terms of $40 per person
per month, the statute also limited the grant to any one family to $240 per month. The
Court said that clearly this was a discrimination, however, it would be upheld because
Maryland had suggested a rational basis for the discrimination. See also Mclnnis v.
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969)(per curiam), where the Court affirmed a three judge district
court decision that a public school financing system based on local school district property
tax levies did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the result of this system was that districts with greater property values provide
more funds per pupil than poorer districts, the legislature could have rationally decided to
base its financing on local property taxes, so such legislation could not be said to be an
invidious discrimination. See Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F.Supp. 327, 332 (N.D. 111. 1968).
In Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), the Court held that a state statute outlawing
the business of debt-adjusting except as an incident to the practicing law did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "Statutes create many classifica-
tions which do not deny equal protection; it is only 'invidious discrimination' which
offends the Constitution." 372 U.S. at 733. The business of debt-adjusting could rationally
be limited to lawyers since clients might need advice as to legality of claims and remedies
under state law, which a non-lawyer could not provide him. 372 U.S. at 732-733. See also
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). where the Supreme Court upheld a state law
prohibiting retail merchants to sell certain items on Sundays. The Court ruled that statu-
tory exemptions for Sunday sale of certain merchandise did not constitute an arbitrary or
invidious discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment: "A statutory dis-
crimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
it." 366 U.S. at 426. The Court found that the state "legislature could reasonably have
found" that the Sunday sale of certain commodities was necessary for the health or welfare
of the populace, and therefore should be exempted from the general ban against Sunday
sales.
- 384 U.S. at 65 1.
47 384 U.S. at 648.
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Finally it has been asserted48 that Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment sets a presumptive benchmark for entry into the
franchise by requiring the states to extend the right of suffrage to
all otherwise qualified male citizens over twenty-one years of age,
or to have their representation reduced accordingly. 49 The oppo-
nents of the Act argue that "[iut surpasses belief that the Con-
stitution authorizes Congress to define the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause so as to outlaw what the Amend-
ment's next [second] section approves." '50 A careful reading of
this section, however, indicates that it is aimed at preventing
restriction of the franchise by the states to otherwise qualified
voters over the age of twenty-one. It is not intended that this
portion of the Fourteenth Amendment prevent further enlarge-
ment of the Franchise, and, consequently, it should not limit
Congress in discharging its responsibilities under Section 5.
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Douglas wrote in Harper v. Virginia Board of Educa-
tion that the "notions of what constitute equal treatment for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change." 51 The prob-
lem then becomes determining which branch of the federal gov-
ernment can react most rapidly and efficiently to these changed
conditions and continue to guarantee equal treatment for all citi-
zens. Katzenbach v. Morgan resolves this problem by extending
the doctrine of initial congressional determination to give great
presumptive weight to congressional interpretation of the substan-
tive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. If the Court con-
tinues to follow this doctrine, Title III should be a constitutional
exercise of congressional power under the Enforcement Clause.
-E. Rick Buell I
4 8 N.Y. Times, April 5, 1970, § 4, at 13, col. 3.
49 Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads in part:
[W]hen the right to vote at any election.., is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the
United States, or in any way abridged ... the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in
such State.
50 N.Y. Times, April 5, 1970, § 4, at 13, col. I.
51 383 U.S. at 669.
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